Traditional healers are a source of health care for which Africans have always paid (Van der Geest 1992) and even with the expansion of modern medicine healers are still popular and command fees exceeding the average treatment cost at most modern practitioners.
1 A possible explanation is that traditional healers have access to valuable and effective therapies unavailable to modern providers. Another view -more widely-held among public health policy-makers -is that they are charlatans who consistently dupe their clients. According to this view, traditional healers exhibit some or all of the following characteristics: they serve only the poor who cannot afford modern medicine; they serve the ignorant who do not know better; they cure patients who are not really sick or would have gotten better anyway;
or they take advantage of a temporary placebo effect to collect payment before the patient feels ill again.
This paper advances the unique view that traditional healers, as a whole, do not possess any super-natural power nor do they cheat their clients, rather that they use important elements of their practice to credibly deliver unobservable medical effort and therefore high quality care. I present a stylized description of the practice of traditional healers garnered from open-ended interviews with healers in Cameroun, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Traditional medicine contrasts with modern medicine in payment method, the focus on the role of the patient, and the ability to enforce contracts; findings supported by the sociological and anthropological literature. An important element of their practice has previously been ignored: traditional healers use outcome-contingent contracts. The mystique surrounding their practice is not unimportant, however. These contracts are only implementable because patients believe that traditional healers are the representatives of higher powers and can therefore verify outcomes.
The success of traditional healers stems from the fact that the other forms of health care available to patients (government-run facilities and church-run (mission) facilities) do 1 In Kenya " [t] he average patient treatment cost per visit (in cash) reported by healers was 46 Ksh, far more than the mean charges even in the private health facilities" (Mwabu, Ainsworth and Nyamete 1993) . In Cameroun the average cost of a visit to a traditional healer is larger than that at either government or church run clinics (Leonard 2000) .
not use outcome-contingent contracts. Health care suffers from asymmetric information because the patient cannot evaluate the appropriateness of practitioner effort. Outcomecontingent contracts are a standard solution to this problem. However, unlike many other production processes, medical effort can be evaluated by other doctors. This fact allows for a second incentive-aligning mechanism; effort-based regulation, used in both government and mission health systems. Outcome-contingent contracts align incentives and therefore improve outcomes, patient utility and welfare. Furthermore, if regulators value patient health, effort-based regulation can also align incentives, improve outcomes, patient utility and welfare. Throughout Africa missions retain much more control over their staff than do governments and their employees therefore have better incentives to provide effort. When patients choose between traditional healers, government centers and mission centers they are choosing between outcome-contingent contracts and effort-based regulation at institutions with low-powered incentives and at institutions with high-powered incentives.
A direct, but unavailable, test of the advantages of different contracts would randomly allocate patients and illnesses to different contract types and contrast outcomes. I do observe outcomes at patient-selected practitioners, but selection will bias the results. Indeed, across Africa there are consistent patterns in the choice of health care practitioner according to illness condition: certain conditions tend to lead to visits to certain practitioners (Mwabu 1986) ). If patients know something about the contracts available at different practitioners and something about the type of resources required to diagnose and cure their condition they could be choosing practitioners based on this information. Rather than correct for self-selection I exploit it as evidence of patients' understanding of the resources that are available at different practitioners, and thus, contract forms.
Using household level data on patient behavior collected in the South-West province of Cameroun this paper explores the choice that patients make between these three types of providers. I develop a simple model of the incentives to provide unobservable medical effort under each contract. This allows me to identify the conditions under which we expect one contract to be superior to another. I use data on what patients knew about their illness before they sought care to categorize illnesses by their degree of responsiveness to medical effort, patient effort and capacity or skill. If traditional healers provide higher levels of effort than government centers (mission centers) the probability of a visit to a traditional healer over a government center (mission center) should increase with the responsiveness of an illness condition to medical effort. The complementarity of medical and patient effort is also put forward as a potentially important factor in the choice of practitioner. When conditions are highly responsive to both medical and patient effort simultaneously the outcome-contingent contract of the traditional healer should have an advantage over effort-based regulation. This results from the fact that practitioners rewarded on the basis of their own effort retain no incentive to encourage or respond to patient effort, but that practitioners rewarded on the basis of outcomes benefit from the impact of patient effort on outcomes.
I run a conditional logit regression over the choice of these three types of practitioner using individual characteristics, illness condition characteristics and travel costs. The results suggest that patients choose to visit traditional healers in patterns that are consistent with traditional healers providing more medical effort than government centers and effort on par with mission centers. They do provide more effort than any center when the responsiveness to medical and patient effort is simultaneously high.
The following section is a description of my interviews with traditional healers. Their practices are different from those of modern providers in obvious ways, but in this section I focus on the subtle and less obvious features of their practices that I think make traditional healers different from other types of providers. Section 2 looks at the incentives to provide unobservable medical effort under both outcome-contingent and effort-based regulation.
Ironically, it is the practice of the traditional healer that is the easiest to model, as effortbased regulation requires additional assumptions about what the regulator optimizes and the monitoring technology available. The model allows me to map out the circumstances under which outcome-contingent contracts are most likely to lead to superior outcomes when compared to effort-contingent regulation. Section 3 introduces the data set and preliminary observations. Section 4 presents the results of a conditional logit estimation using illness characteristic data as well as individual characteristics. Illness characteristics are significant determinants of a visit to a traditional healer and the patterns observed are compatible with the theory that patients visit traditional healers to take advantage of the unique contract they offer. Section 5 concludes.
Traditional Healers
A random sample of 800 households in South-West Province of Cameroun (this data is discussed in greater detail in section 3) suggests that patients who visit traditional healers make different payments if they are cured than if they are not cured. Two types of payments were identified in the survey, those made before and those made after treatment. For patients who were cured of their ailments the average total payment both before and after was 6,500
CFA (approximately 13 USD), whereas those not cured paid 3,300 CFA (p=0.077). Payments made after the initial consultation varied even more: 5,000 CFA in successful cases compared to 1,400 CFA in unsuccessful cases (p=0.047). For visits to modern practitioners payments are higher in unsuccessful cases (often requiring additional expense on medication) though the difference is not significant. Preliminary research on this question was based on personal observation gained from living in rural Gabon and information contained in several anthropological and medical studies of traditional healers in Zaire, Burundi, South Africa, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Botswana, Zimbabwe and general sources (Korse et al. 1989 , Baerts 1989 , Edwards 1983 , Oyenye and Orubuloye 1985 , Lasker 1981 , Staugard 1985 , Gelfand et al. 1985 , Normann 1990 , Conco 1972 . To confirm the patterns suggested by the literature and the survey of the ill I interviewed traditional healers in three African countries; Cameroun, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Three interviews with healers were conducted in Cameroun, 5 in Tanzania and 7 in Ethiopia. 2 The interviews were open-ended and focused primarily on the following:
• The procedure for reviewing and accepting a patient.
• The method for obtaining information about the condition presented.
• The use of 'modern' medicines.
• The method and timing of payments for a disease episode.
• The use of enchantments or spells to encourage timely payment.
The basic findings were similar in Tanzania and Cameroun, with a few differences in Ethiopia.
Tanzania and Cameroun
Healers in Tanzania and Cameroun accepted almost all cases presented. Though they were often known for certain specialties, all claimed to have a variety of skills. Among the problems they specifically mentioned treating were stomach problems, irregular menses, infertility, impotence, distended abdomen, swelling in the extremities, migraine headaches, convulsions, eye problems, bone-setting, mental illnesses, sexually transmitted diseases, chest pain, malnutrition and worms.
Though most examinations of patients were much longer and more detailed than those of their modern medical counterparts, few involved physical examination. Most healers said they asked extensive questions about the symptoms in order to gather information. Many said they could form a preliminary diagnosis from interviews with other family members who came to ask for help (Conco (pp 294), Staugard (pp 74-81).)
Healers often integrated the entire family in treatment when they thought it was necessary. They did this in three ways: first they consulted family members to learn more about the causes of the disease; second they would use family members integrally in the cure, especially if the patient was returning home; and third they prescribed and proscribed habits for to spirit channelers to religious scribes. Mid-wives who also treated illnesses were included.
family members as well as for the patient. A healer I interviewed in Tanzania regarded the families of alcoholics as his patients (since it was generally they and not the alcoholic who sought care) and gave medicine to both the alcoholic and her family. be after he saw the result of his treatment. The patient also developed an expectation of the payment and then they bargained to reach a conclusion. This is not an uncommon way to decide compensation for services rendered, especially in Cameroun. Though it might seem that the healer has no power to bargain after he has cured someone, I will show that he bargains from a position of considerable strength.
In some cases no further payment was required and the healers reported that future payments were 'up to the charity' of the patient. I distinguish this from the previous case by the fact that the healers claimed they expected no payment. However, they were also clear that everyone who had been cured made some payment. These were healers who dealt almost exclusively with people from their own larger community. I found that healers with wide-spread reputations who often dealt with patients from outside their community were much more specific about their expectations of payment.
Almost every healer said of the second payment that they expected less from people who were less able to pay and all healers expected that any large payments would be made at harvest time or in kind. Many waited years for final payments (see Staugard (pp 103, 112, 113) and .) There was no indication that healers were quick to declare victory and collect their bills. In one case a healer who specialized in infertility told me that he waited until the child was 7 years old before he considered the mother to have been cured of infertility! When asked about the practice of poisoning patients for non-payment many healers were adamant that they never engaged in the practice, 5 though almost all admitted that their ancestors, or specifically parents, had done so. The practice traditionally operated as follows: when a patient refused to pay the healer, would either invoke a curse on the patient or revoke the cure. Neither of these actions took place in the presence of the patient.
They are considered to be among the strongest forms of magic. This practice invokes near universal fear in rural populations, and most non-healers believed that if they failed to pay they would be poisoned. This is a very useful belief for healers, since they need only wait until the patient eventually falls sick of anything. All healers told me stories of patients leaving without paying and then returning, sometimes years later, begging to be allowed to pay. That patients believe poisoning is still practiced allows healers to wait until after the treatment to collect payment without fear that the patient will refuse to pay.
Ethiopia
The practices of many traditional healers interviewed in Ethiopia were different than those of Cameroun and Tanzania. Most healers specialized in at most 3 or 4 medicines and their corresponding illnesses. They were known popularly as 'the healer who has a good medicine for ... .' They almost always charged a fixed price for a fixed dose with exceptions only for the extremely poor and their own family members. When asked if they accepted payment after giving the medicines they almost all said no, that in fact receipt of payment was part of the ceremony of preparation. They did not examine patients except in the case of demon possession.
I interviewed two healers in Ethiopia who used payment schemes similar to those discussed in section 1.1. Both treated a wide variety of diseases, as did the healers interviewed in Cameroun and Tanzania. In the sample, contingent payment schemes were perfectly associated with healers who cured a wide variety of diseases and fixed payment schemes were perfectly associated with healers who specialized in only a few medicines. This suggests that the skill for which only a fixed payment is made is that of preparing well-known medicines, and the skill for which a contingent payment was made is that of diagnosing diseases.
The practices of traditional healers are steeped in tradition and mystique. All healers see their practices within the context of culture and tradition and many were reluctant to talk about payment. Nonetheless, they are all paid for their services, whether in kind or in cash. The form of payment along with some of the other aspects of their practice form a pattern in which traditional healers face very different incentives to care for their patients than other providers. Traditional healers exert great resources in examination and the derivation of diagnoses. They specifically direct patients as to their own responsibilities in treatment. They use outcome-contingent contracts. They use the element of 'magic' to enforce contracts. I found evidence that they might use modern medicines.
Effort and Capacity
Patients visit a health care practitioner to benefit from the intervention of health care in the course of an illness. I simplify the intervention of health care into two components; that of effort and that of capacity. Capacity, or skill should be thought of as a location-specific constant, derived from the availability of equipment, medicines, the training of the personnel posted at the center, etc. Capacity is observable: hospitals have more capacity than clinics and clinics more capacity than traditional healers. Effort is a variable input and cannot be directly observed, but is at least as important as capacity. Being in the best equipped hospital in the world is of no use to a patient if no one will care for her. I assume modern medicine is clearly superior to traditional medicine in terms of capacity; the comparative advantage of traditional medicine is in the provision of effort.
Effort in health care is a classic example of hidden action (Arrow 1963, Dranove and White 1987) . The patient cannot evaluate what the doctor is doing for her sake. People visit doctors because doctors have superior knowledge of diseases and treatments. Similarly, the practitioner cannot observe the effort that the patient exerts for her own health. This is important because many health improving activities cause disutility that the patient would prefer to avoid. I take a broad view of patient effort in this paper and consider it to be the collection of all efforts of family members in the production of health. Most services commonly associated with nursing in the west are performed by family members in Africa.
Patients can know the level of capacity provided and can therefore evaluate the benefit they can expect to receive from it. However they cannot directly know the level of effort exerted. Therefore it is important to examine the incentives of each practitioner to exert effort. When the patient observes that practitioners have strong incentives to exert effort and effort matters for the condition from which she suffers, she will anticipate greater benefit to her health.
Medical Effort at Traditional Healers
The outcome-contingent contract offered by the traditional healer creates incentives for the practitioner to exert effort. To show this I introduce a simple model of health seeking behavior. A combination of capacity (5) 
Since neither p nor m was measured in observable units, converting to p' or m! is arbitrary. minus the disutility of his effort.
By increasing his effort the practitioner can increase his expected payment. The traditional healer will choose to exert effort at the point where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. This level of effort is always less than the optimal level of effort when r < 1.
The patient also retains incentives to exert effort and her utility will be the share of the value of health retained, minus the disutility of effort exerted, minus the fixed fees, minus the travel costs.
Patients will exert effort until the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. Again, this level of effort is less than the optimal level when (1 -r) < 1. (s,m,p) >V5mp dp dp I assume that h(s : m,p) has the properties of a standard production function (J^ > 0, J^ < 0), and therefore, if one condition has a higher marginal benefit of effort for every level of effort the equilibrium level of effort will be higher for that condition.
Definition 1 (Responsiveness to Medical Effort) An illness condition

Proposition 1 For two diseases with otherwise identical production functions, if illness A
is more responsive to medical effort than illness B, more medical effort will be provided for illness A.
Proposition 2 For two diseases with otherwise identical production functions, if illness A
is more responsive to patient effort than illness B, more patient effort will be provided for illness A.
Despite the fact that patients cannot observe medical effort, traditional healers will provide generally high (though not optimal) levels of effort that are increasing in the responsiveness of the disease to medical effort.
Medical effort at other practitioners
Why then do we not observe these contracts more frequently in health care? A contingent-fee scheme depends on the practitioner's knowing the outcome of the disease. If the practitioner does not know the outcome he cannot insure that the patient makes the proper payments.
Outcomes are difficult to observe, and more difficult to verify. Often, when the patient leaves the clinic or hospital, the outcome is not yet known by anyone. If government centers were paid on the basis of outcomes, patients would have strong incentives to lie or not return.
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The healer is able to use outcome-contingent contracts because he maintains a cloud of mystery over his practice that encourages people to tell the truth about their condition.
The institution of quality assurance commonly observed in Africa is direct monitoring of the practitioner (effort-based regulation). The employer of the practitioner does not seek to know the outcome of treatment but does observe other outcomes that give information about the effort of the practitioners. Practitioners produce both health for the patient and what I call organizational quality. This second output is observed by the employer. Records are kept of the various activities that go into producing health. Typically a selection of records are examined during a site visit. The patients' symptoms and complaints are part of all records and therefore procedures and records should follow protocols developed for each set of complaints. If a particular record or collection of records is determined to be in violation of standards the practitioner is punished in accordance with the gravity of the deviation.
These practitioners provide quality effort because if they do not, they will be punished.
The penalty for deviation varies between the two organizational practitioners examined in this paper. Supervisors of government facilities do not have the power to fire, promote or demote or give bonuses to personnel. 8 Church-based supervisors, on the other hand, can fire, promote or demote personnel when justified and discretionary bonuses are common. Thus, mission personnel will exert more effort and adhere closer to protocols than government personnel.
Organizational quality is a measure specifically designed to be highly correlated with outcomes. It can be seen as a production function (q(m, s)) that is similar to the production function for health itself. Practitioners seek to maximize their utility by choosing m that equates the marginal change in q with the marginal disutility of effort and exert more effort when the responsiveness of organizational quality to medical effort is larger. Assuming q is correlated with /i, medical effort should increase when the responsiveness of h to medical effort is high, i.e. protocols are appropriately designed. However, since q is not a measure of outcomes the change in q with respect to p must be zero {-^ = 0). Examination of records would show that correct diagnostic procedures were used and that correct medicines were prescribed but they would be unable to show whether or not the patient took her medicines 8 1 was present for a number of supervision visits to government centers. By reviewing records the supervisor was able to form a surprisingly detailed picture of the quality of the center, which in one case was particularly dismal. At that center the supervisor severely berated the staff during the visit. As we left I asked him what he would do if he returned and found the same conditions. He said there was nothing he could do, and then pointed out that this was his fourth consecutive visit in which he had found the same problems and admonished the staff in the same manner.
correctly, for example.
Joint determination of medical and patient effort
Both the outcome-contingent contract and effort-based regulation can deliver high levels of medical effort. However, if both medical and patient effort are necessary the outcomecontingent contract cannot achieve the full information solution (Holmstrom 1982) . When r is less than one and greater than zero both the patient and practitioner do not face the full incentives. On the other hand, effort-based regulation can, in theory, achieve the full information solution. In general, it will not do so for a variety of reasons; monitoring is imperfect and neither governments nor missions are pure social welfare maximizers. Since neither regulation nor welfare maximizing play a role in the traditional healer contract, these failures in effort-based regulation might increase the relative advantage of traditional healers.
In addition, the fact that patient effort is important in health care suggests a more fundamental difference between the two types of contracts. For outcome-contingent contracts, the level of effort provided by either the practitioner or the patient will depend on the level of effort provided by the other. Changes in the patients' expectation of medical effort will change the optimal level of patient effort. If medical and patient effort are complements then the expectation of higher medical effort will lead to higher patient effort and, in parallel, the expectation of higher patient effort will lead to higher medical effort.
Proposition 3 // the cross-partial of health with respect to medical and patient effort is positive an increase in patient effort will lead to an increase in medical effort.
Define m*(p) to be the function describing the optimal level of medical effort given the practitioner's expectation of patient effort (the reaction function). Implicit differentiation yields dm*(p) dp dm?
With decreasing marginal returns, if the cross-partial is positive, then the change in the optimal m with respect to p is positive.
The healer has a direct incentive to encourage patients to exert effort; if patient effort increases the expected outcome, it increases the practitioner's expected payment. Proposition 3 shows that there is a second effect of patient effort which depends on whether patient and medical effort are complements. If efforts are complements the more effort the patient exerts the more useful is the effort of the practitioner. The effect of these incentives can be seen in the degree to which healers concentrate on encouraging or forcing patients to exert effort, as discussed in section 1.1.
I propose that medical and patient effort can be characterized as complements. The patient seeks the care of a practitioner precisely because she cannot do what the practitioner does. Though there are some areas in which patients could substitute for practitioner effort these have already been exploited in Africa. Patients and their families already provide a number of medical services typically provided by nurses in the west. 9 For the activities that remain, medical and patient effort are not substitutes, but, are they complements?
The things a patient can do incorrectly (that would not be observable) include not taking medication as prescribed, not looking for important signs of a worsening condition or not bothering to notify the practitioner if they are observed, not resting long enough, not eating properly or not observing proper hygiene, to name just a few. These failures on the part of the patient are not trivial concerns -they can render the best therapy useless.
Though the cross partial of health with respect to patient and medical effort is positive, the cross partial of organizational quality is zero, because patient effort is not observed by regulators. This does not prevent the regulator from achieving the optimal solution; he can act as a Stackelberg leader if he has information about the patient's reaction function.
However, experience suggests that health regulators, far from knowing the reaction function of patients, see patients as passive players in their own health, and do not take into account 9
Van der Geest and Sarkodie (1998) provide an eye-opening description of life as a patient in a typical African hospital, including the extensive reliance on family to provide important nursing functions.
the effort of the patient at any level.
In a separate investigation a team with which I participated observed consultations by practitioners at government and mission hospitals and clinics in Tanzania. 10 Of 450 consultations observed, in only 16% (17% at government and 11% at mission facilities) did the doctor tell the patient what the diagnosis was or what medicine was being prescribed. In only 6% of cases (7% at government and 5% at mission) did the doctor inform the patient of any activity that she could undertake to increase the chance of recovery or to avoid a similar illness in the future. Of cases in which a dispensing nurse gave the patient drugs requiring that the patient know how or when to take the drug in only 32% (38% at government and 30% at mission) did the nurse check to see if the patient had any idea how to do so. Patient effort is not a priority in either mission or government organizations. They do not even take into account the effect of effort on outcomes, much less react to patient provision of effort in their own decision about how much effort to exert.
Capacity
Capacity is important in the provision of health but is more readily observable. Each location has a fixed level of capacity but illness conditions respond differently to capacity.
In our sample modern providers operate both clinics and hospitals. A mission clinic is, by design, similar in capacity to a government clinic, and hospitals are also similar. Thus For example, if B c -B u is smaller for one condition than another, the difference in expected benefit of visiting a clinic and an untrained practitioner is smaller for the first condition.
The first condition is less responsive to the different levels of skill.
Patient Selection of Practitioners
The definitions of the word patient include 'one that is acted upon.' Indeed Sen (1995, pp 11) used this definition in a different context as a contrast to agents: "To see [them] as patients rather than as agents can undermine the exercise ... Not to focus on the fact that they think, choose, act, and respond is to miss something terribly crucial." Just as the regulator views patients as passive, public health and health economics too often focuses on the activity of practitioners on passive patients. In Africa, where there is no formal health insurance system that ties patients to institutions, patients are very active in the exercise of their freedom to choose a practitioner.
I have suggested the following differences between centers. Traditional healers provide high levels of effort and encourage patients to do so as well. Mission clinics and hospitals also provide high levels of effort but do not encourage patients to do so. Government hospitals and clinics, on the other hand, do not provide high levels of effort. Clinics provide higher levels of capacity than traditional healers, and hospitals provide higher levels of capacity than clinics. These differences are known to patients and will lead to distinct patterns in the choice of practitioner.
Proposition 1 stated that as the responsiveness to medical effort increased the amount of medical effort provided also increased. Some practitioners have higher powered incentives to provide effort and this difference will be most important when medical effort has the greatest impact on outcomes. Since all effort provision is sub-optimal (none of the contracts achieve the full information solution) an increase in effort is welfare improving. Thus, for two different illness conditions A and B, and two different practitioners I and II, Hypothesis 1 // condition A is more responsive to medical effort than condition B and practitioner I faces greater incentives to provide unobservable effort than practitioner II then the probability of a patient's choosing provider I over II will be higher for condition A than condition B.
Proof (as well as propositions 2 and 3 that follow) requires specification of functional forms and is contained in appendix A.
From proposition 4, Hypothesis 2 // condition A is more responsive to capacity at a given level of practitioner (untrained, clinic or hospital) than condition B the probability of a patients choosing that level over other levels will be higher for condition A than condition B.
Proposition 3 stated that for traditional healers an increase in p leads to an increase in TO. It is unlikely that this effect exists for organizational practitioners (missions and the government). If medical effort under effort-based regulation does not increase with the responsiveness to patient effort then the outcome-contingent contract is more likely to be superior to effort-based regulation when the responsiveness to patient effort is high. 'low' and 'high' effort for organizational practitioners. 'High' effort at a traditional healer cannot be directly compared to 'high' effort at an organizational practitioner, however, the best a traditional healer can do when compared to an organizational practitioner is when both practitioners provide 'high' levels of effort. This corresponds to illness conditions where the responsiveness to both medical and patient effort are high. This intuition leads to the following hypothesis (a formal proof is given in appendix A.)
Hypothesis 3 // condition A is more responsive to medical effort than condition B and the responsiveness to patient effort is high the probability of choosing a traditional healer over a mission clinic or hospital is higher for condition A than condition B.
Note that, even if the responsiveness to medical effort is high, a patient might prefer to visit a modern provider since the patient retains the full incentive to exert effort on her behalf. It is only when she expects that her effort and medical effort could complement each other that she will seek an outcome-contingent contract.
Travel is a significant factor in the cost of seeking care and patients will always prefer to reduce travel costs when possible. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 A patient is more likely to visit a practitioner if she lives closer to that practitioner.
These propositions permit investigation of patient perceptions of the level of effort provided by traditional healers, government practitioners and mission practitioners. If traditional healers are providing high levels of effort I should be able to detect this by comparing the conditions reported at government, mission and traditional practitioners.
Data
To examine the role of incentives in the choice of practitioner I use data collected on patient behavior in the face of illness in Mbonge Sub-Division, in the South-West province of Cameroun in 1994 11 . Mbonge sub-division is entirely rural. This area was chosen because of the presence of a German aid project which insured a consistent, reasonably-priced drug supply in all government health centers and hospitals permitting the claim that factors other than the availability of drugs are driving patients' choices. This fact also suggests that patients can be relatively sure of receiving some treatment at any location. 40 villages were randomly chosen and 20 randomly selected households from each village were interviewed. Data were collected on all members of the household. 4,489 individuals were thus polled, of which 681 illness episodes were reported within the month previous to the survey. We choose the recall period of a month to increase the quality of the data on illness visits. I focus on the first location visited in the search for care and 548 of these episodes resulted in first visits to one of the five types of practitioners examined in this paper (I have complete data for 533). Other practitioners included drug peddlers, pharmacists, neighbors, private hospitals, private clinics and parastatal hospitals. Villages sampled were an average of 28 km from a government clinic, 51 km from a government hospital, 87 km from a mission clinic and 212 km from a mission hospital. Table 1 compares patients by their choice of practitioner. The characteristics are divided into two categories, those of the patient herself and those of the care-giver (the patient is the default care-giver). The age of the patient is significantly less than the age of the care-giver since children make up a significant portion of patients but are never care-givers.
The average reported family income is equivalent to just over 1,500 USD per year. Table 1 gives preliminary support to the hypothesis that people who visit traditional healers are too poor to use other health facilities. The income of patients who visit traditional healers is low. Since it appears visitors to traditional healers are older, a more reliable measure is the income of care-givers and the family wealth. On both of these counts visitors to healers appear to be among the poorest in the sample. On the other hand, education levels do not reflect this pattern. We will see that travel costs are a significant factor in the choice of a practitioner. Access to a road both reduces travel costs and increases incomes (this is a general phenomenon in Africa). Since traditional healers are located throughout the sample and government clinics are the most widely distributed of the modern health care practitioners, it is likely that choosing a healer or government clinic out of geographical isolation from other centers is correlated with poverty. Since education levels do not have the same geographical distribution as income and wealth, the same pattern is not observed. I will show that, when travel costs are taken into account, individuals with higher levels of income still seek out missions, but there is no effect of care-giver income or family wealth. Table 2 shows evidence of patient selection of providers. This table reports the outcomes at different practitioners. Almost 5% of people who visited traditional healers died and healers have the lowest cure rate (looking at both 'cured' and the sum of 'cured' and 'well enough'.)
Self-Selection by Illness Condition
At first glance, this supports the idea that these practitioners are charlatans. However, by this measure, the second worst practitioner is the mission hospital. Mission hospitals are, beyond question, the highest quality centers. The best cure rates are at government clinics and these are the worst of the modern practitioners. The findings do not reflect quality, but rather self-selection by illness condition.
Note as well that 30% of the conditions reported at traditional healers involved ongoing treatment; healers are not using temporary placebo effects. Healers appear to refer some patients, although we do not know if they were referred to modern providers or other traditional healers. The results are even stronger when we look at the satisfaction people express for the care they received. The highest rate of disappointment is with mission hospitals. One person in the entire sample was disappointed with the quality of care they received at a government clinic, 98% were either partially or fully satisfied.
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These numbers do not say that government clinics are providing high quality care, rather that government clinics deliver exactly the care patients expect. Government clinics are specializing in easy-to-treat illnesses, and mission hospitals and traditional healers are tackling the tougher cases.
Information about their illness condition drives patients to incur significant cost in the search of care. The survey was designed to elicit information that patients had before they sought care: all of the symptoms they experienced; the self-declared severity of the disease;
If drugs had not been present at these centers, or more importantly, if they had been irregularly present, dissatisfaction would undoubtedly have increased.
the number of days sick before seeking care; and the number of those days in which the patient was bedridden. A table of symptom prevalence at each provider is included in appendix B as table 10. This table show These scores are referred to as codings A, B and C. In addition to these three sets of scores, scores were created using basic medical references (Griffith 1985 , Strickland, ed 1984 , Werner 1977 Explanatory Variables The x variables used in the regressions that follow are the age, gender, education level, and income (log) of both the patient and her care-giver, as well as the family wealth. 13 Patient characteristics should capture variation in the value of health.
Care-giver characteristics should capture variation in the ability to transform health care into health, perceptions of the relative merit of different practitioners, or the ability to negotiate over the terms of care among other things.
The z variables used are the responsiveness to patient and medical effort (E p and E m ), the range of outcomes (<j), and the joint effect of medical and patient effort. The y variables used in the following regressions are the travel cost to each practitioner and the responsiveness of the condition to capacity. Note that traditional healers, governments and missions differ in their response to the characteristics of the illness, clinics differ from hospitals in travel costs and skill and all locations differ from each other in their relationship to individual characteristics.
Illness Characteristic Data
There are four data sets on the characteristics of each illness, corresponding to the four codings. Each variable is not perfectly correlated with its corresponding variable across all data sets. However, the collection of variables in each data set comprises a medical opinion about the condition faced by the patient, and therefore a more interesting test is the degree to which the 'opinions' reach the same conclusion. I create a weighted score for each variable (E p , E mj <r, B u , B c , Bh). The average score would be a weight of 0.25 on each coding, for example. The weight assigned to each scoring is fixed for all variables. Fixing the weight for medical references to 1, I find the optimal weights 13 Family wealth is the log of predicted total family income obtained by regressing actual total income on observable characteristics of the household (roofing material, type of floor, ownership of durables, etc.). This helps to avoid the strong correlation, for adult males, between income and total family income. In addition, if a family had an outside source of income this should be partially captured in the instrumented family wealth.
14 E p and E m together explain 94%(Med Refs), 96% (A), 97% (B) and 99% (C) of the variance in E p • E m .
for the other three codings; where optimal is maximum likelihood for the conditional logit regression described above. Table 4 records the weights obtained. A test that the weights of A, B and C are not equal to zero fails to reject the null (that they are all equal to zero) at the 5% level. A test that the weight on the medical reference coding is zero is rejected (p-value 0.0000). The coding by medical references does the best job of explaining the observed pattern of visits (it has the largest weight). Furthermore, the other codings contain information that is made largely redundant by the information contained in the coding by medical references. Thus, I present the results for the regression using medical references coding. Table 5 reports the coefficients and z-tests for the regression on medical references. The coefficients for the traditional healer are normalized to 0, so, for example, the negative coefficient on the age of the patient in the column for the government clinic implies that increasing the age of the patient increases the probability of a visit to a traditional healer over a government clinic. Variations in the age, education and income of patients are the only significant predictors of visits among individual and care-giver characteristics. Visitors to traditional healers are not less educated than visitors to other practitioners and they are more educated than visitors to mission clinics. They earn less income than visitors to mission centers, but are not from poorer families.
Results
The collection of illness condition characteristics play a significant role in the choice of practitioner. The responsiveness of the illness condition to patient effort does not appear to play any direct role in the choice of practitioner. The responsiveness to medical effort is significantly negative for visits to government centers, and negative, but insignificant for visits to mission centers. Hypothesis 1 stated that if one practitioner exerted more effort than another, patients are more likely to visit the high effort practitioner when they suffer from a condition that is responsive to medical effort. Thus, patients choose practitioners as if they believed that traditional healers provide more effort then either government clinics or hospitals and similar levels of effort to mission clinics and hospitals. In addition, the joint effect of efforts is significant for both government and mission practitioners. Thus patients are more likely to visit traditional healers when the responsiveness to both medical and patient effort are high, as suggested by hypothesis 3.
Multinomial coefficients age (ind) female (ind) education (ind) log income (ind) age (c-g) female (c-g) education (c-g) log income (c-g) log wealth The coefficient for capacity is significant and positive meaning that as the benefit of capacity for the patient's illness condition at a given practitioner increases the likelihood of a visit to that practitioner also increases, confirming hypothesis 2. In addition the coefficient for travel is significant, confirming hypothesis 4; patients prefer to travel shorter distances if they can. Table 6 shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on the choice of practi-tioner derived from the 4 sets of coefficients of the logit. Each element can be read as the percentage change in the probability of visiting a practitioner given a one percent change in the respective variable from its average value. Elasticities for the responsiveness to medical effort are reported at three different values of the responsiveness to patient effort, (low is 20th percentile and high is 80th percentile.) Elasticities are not reported for individual characteristics with no significant coefficients. Increasing the level of education has a strong positive impact on the probability of a visit to a traditional healer, with the difference coming from visitors to mission clinics. I do not believe education is really driving these results, it is a proxy for some other important but unobserved variable. However, this does strongly contradict the hypothesis that it is only the ignorant who visit traditional healers.
Reducing the income of a patient does reduce the probability of a visit to a traditional healer. The fact that family wealth and care-giver income do not have this effect imply that it is not the case that only the poor visit traditional healers, but there is some remaining preference for traditional healers among the poor. Notice (from table 5) that traditional healers are differentiated from mission centers, not from government centers, by the income of patients. If healers were the only option available to the poor they would be differentiated from government centers by income. It appears that, when a poor person has a condition that would be best treated at a mission facility but cannot afford the mission center, she goes to the traditional healer. The traditional healer is a substitute for high quality, not low quality. This could be a result of the implied credit and subsidy available in the contract at a traditional healer. Poor patients are asked to pay less and even that is in kind and when the patient is able. Mission centers attempt to reduce fees for the poor, but a major component of the cost of a visit to a mission center is travel costs, which cannot be reduced or forgiven.
Age appears to play an important role, but I have no particular hypothesis about the role it should play. Age could contain some uncaptured information about income earning opportunities. It might contain information about unobserved variations in illness conditions but this should have been taken into account in the codings.
When the range of possible outcomes is larger the probability of a visit to a government facility is increased, whereas the probability of a visit to a mission center or traditional healer is decreased. The effect is quite strong at traditional healers. I hypothesize that this variable captures information about the urgency of care. If there is a health crisis, patients will always find someone present at a government clinic or hospital. Traditional healers are not on call and do not have stocks of medicine on hand. Mission centers, as well, are generally further away, and thus less useful in the case of urgency. This analysis is poorly suited to address this issue because we examine only the first location visited even if the bulk of care was received at another place. Our survey did not ask about the main care provider.
The effect of an increase in the responsiveness to medical effort on the probability of visiting a traditional healer is small when the responsiveness to patient effort is low, but quite significant when the responsiveness to patient effort is high. When the responsiveness to both medical and patient effort is high patients are drawn from all four other locations to traditional healers, but mostly from government centers.
The analysis of the advantages of visiting different providers suggested 4 hypotheses: patients visit high effort providers when they need medical effort; they seek outcome-contingent contracts when they need both medical and patient effort; they seek high capacity providers when they need capacity and they prefer to travel shorter distances if they can. Combining this with evidence that government facilities are low effort facilities and missions are high effort facilities, I suggested that traditional healers provide more effort than government facilities and might provide more effort than mission facilities. The results agree with the hypotheses and suggest that traditional healers indeed do provide more effort than government centers, and effort on par with mission centers. More importantly, an important feature of the outcome-contingent contract and the practices of traditional healers as described in section 1.1 is confirmed in the data: healers work with patients better than modern providers.
Conclusions
Traditional healers do not possess any super-natural power nor do they cheat their clients; they use important elements of their practice to credibly deliver unobservable medical effort and therefore high quality care. One view of traditional healers had suggested that they serve only the poor; that they serve the ignorant who do not know better; that they cure patients who are not really sick; or that they take advantage of a temporary placebo effect. This paper has shown that, although poorer people visit traditional healers more often than the non-poor this is almost entirely due to a geographic effect in which the bulk of the poor have larger additional travel costs to other providers. Visitors to traditional healers are more educated than the average patient and it therefore seems unlikely they are more ignorant. Visitors to traditional healers are most often people who would have visited a mission hospital or clinic if they had not gone to a traditional healer. They are the sicker and harder to cure patients, not the easier ones. Interactions with a traditional healer are extended over long periods of time because payments are often delayed. If healers sought a temporary placebo effect, they would avoid such lengthy interactions. The model advanced in this paper assumes that traditional healers have no extraordinary power, and this model has reasonable predictive power. By Occam's razor, therefore, I reject the theory that healers use magic to cure their patients. The magic in traditional medicine is implementation not medicine.
The analysis of this paper is based on one area of one country in Africa. This province is relatively wealthy (though the roads are not good), and government practitioners in the area are better than average (due to the regular supply of drugs). This paper cannot reach definitive conclusions for all of Africa. None-the-less, the fact that the practices of healers observed replicate the findings of anthropologists throughout Africa suggests that the same problems are being solved in the same manner throughout Africa.
I have advanced an image of patients as active agents in their own health; they process important information before seeking care and react to the incentives they face to provide effort in their own care. It is easy to criticize the apparent ignorance of modern providers to this characteristic of patients, but this attitude is near universal in health care; it is not unique to Africa. This view of patients should be informative in the wider inquiries of health economics.
A Mathematical Exposition of Health Care Model
The health production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form, wh = Ap a vnP, where a is the responsiveness to patient effort and (3 the responsiveness to medical effort. I assume that Q + (3 < 1. A is a shift term, containing a number of other factors. Utility is thus Ap^mP -p.
A.I Full Information
Under full information both medical and patient effort are supplied to the point where their marginal benefit is equal to their marginal cost. Maximizing utility with respect to medical and patient effort we obtain optimal patient effort (p FI ), optimal medical effort (m FI ) and
(4b) 
Note that patient effort, medical effort and utility are all less than under the full information solution.
for which the two utilities are equal, z.
When z = z, UTB -UIP -0. Thus, by definition, if z > z the utility of visiting an institutional provider is larger than the utility of visiting a traditional healer (ignoring other costs). If z < z the utility of visiting a traditional healer is larger, z is fixed for each institution, but z varies according to a and (3 (among other things).. Thus it is possible that z > i\ for condition 1, but that z < z~2 for condition 2. In order to be able to say which conditions are most likely to lead to z>z or z<z,I explore the properties of z.
For the standard properties of a Cobb-Douglas production function to hold (output is increasing in both a and /?), medical and patient effort must both be greater than 1. However, I cannot simply assume this since efforts are determined endogenously. For them both to be greater than 1, A must be 'large.' Thus, health care is valuable. If A is not 'large' not seeking health care is preferable to seeking health care. I assume that A is large enough so that both p* and ra* are greater than one. Since ln(l -r) < 0 we can sign the derivatives as follows: f > 0, § > 0, and £ §^ > 0.
Recall that z is fixed for both government and mission providers. If traditional healers provide higher levels of effort than government facilities (z for the government is relatively low) the probability of visiting a traditional healer will be higher when a and (3 are larger.
The same holds for mission facilities. In addition, traditional healers have a greater compar-ative advantage when a and (5 are simultaneously large. Table 8 shows the correlation between codings of the capacity of the three levels of practitioners. We expect the responsiveness to capacity at any given level to be correlated across codings. In fact we find that the benefit to an untrained practitioner as given by medical references is negatively correlated with A, positively correlated with B, and uncorrelated with C. The responsiveness to capacity at a clinic for the medical references is correlated with A, and uncorrelated with either B or C. The responsiveness to capacity at a hospital for medical references is significantly positively correlated to all centers. Table 9 shows the correlation across centers for the range in outcomes. The coding from 1.00 0.17* 1.00 -0.14* 0.02 significant at 10% (*) medical references is significantly positively correlated across all centers. Table 10 shows the prevalence of symptoms reported to each practitioner. Reported are the number of episodes in which that symptom was found as well as the deviation in percentage points of the observed against the predicted percentage of visits. If the proportion of visits with a given symptom is equal to the total proportion of patients visiting that practitioner, the deviation is zero. Table 11 shows the results of a regression of assigned codes (for the medical references) against symptoms, patient and episode characteristics. Symptoms are listed in decreasing order of prevalence and include only those symptoms with at least 10 observations. 
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